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First person shot. New Forms of  Subjectivity  
between Cinema and Intermedia Networks
Abstract 
The article analyzes the first person shot, a stylistic figure resulting from a radical transforma-
tion of  the classical point of  view or subjective shot within the contemporary media landscape. 
The first part of  the article focuses on two main features of  the first person shot. On the one 
hand, it is an intermedia figure, arising from the reciprocal interactions of  technological inno-
vations which unfolded on different media platforms: the steadycam and its derivatives, digital 
cameras and their miniaturized versions, surveillance equipments, videogames playable from a 
first-person perspective.  On the other hand, it is an experiential figure, as it directly expresses 
the dynamic grasp of  the world, enacted by a hybrid agent (a body – sensor), and consequently 
its perceptual, practical, emotional, living and ongoing experience. 
The second part of  the article considers the first person shot as a figure expressing in sensorial 
terms a well defined idea of  subject and subjectivity. This idea contrasts with the main concep-
tions adopted by film and media scholars: the article analyzes the debate between J. L. Baudry 
and V. Sobchack and argues that both scholars –despite their different philosophical premises– 
consider the subject as an entity defined by its position in a specific location.  Rather, in the 
case of  the first person shot the subject is continuously redefined through a constant shifting; 
hence the subject should be conceived as dis-posed and dis-located. Finally, the article argues 
that this conception of  subject and subjectivity links film and media studies to current mind 
theories inspired by cognitive phenomenology, which elaborated a conception of  subject as a 
dynamic agent involved in an ongoing narrative negotiation of  selfhood through continuous 
flows of  transformations.
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1. Introduction 
In this article I will analyze a linguistic and stylistic figure which I consider 
characteristic of  contemporary audiovisual media; I will call it «first person 
shot»1. First person shot represents the transformation of  the classical figure 
of  point of  view shot –or subjective shot–, within the contemporary inter-
media network.
The epistemological premise of  my argument is that the figures of  style 
are at the crossroad between two kinds of  phenomena. On the one hand, they 
refer to some technologies which made possible their origin; on the other 
hand, the figures of  style express abstract theoretical concepts in sensorial 
forms; in other words, they are figures of  thought. This epistemological pre-
mise is needed to understand my analysis of  first person shot. In the first part 
of  my article I will analyze the different technologies that contributed to the 
transformation of  point of  view shot into first person shot; besides this, I will 
compare the two figures in order to highlight the first person shot specific fea-
tures. In the second part of  the article I will consider the first person shot as a 
figure of  thought; I will argue that it urges film and media theory to rethink its 
idea of  subject and subjectivity (i.e. subjective identity formation and expres-
sion), in order to shift from a “locative”, “positional” and static conception of  
the subject to a dynamic, “dis-positional” and “dis-locative” one.
2. From the point of  view shot to the first person shot
2.1. Converging technologies: a genealogy of  first person shot
First person shot derives from five major technological and stylistic in-
novations which affected the film and media field from the beginning of  the 
Eighties until now. It’s worth noting that these innovations are not important 
in themselves, but rather for their dynamical interaction (see below).
The first innovation is the introduction of  the Steadicam, marketed in 
1975 but used extensively since the beginning of  the Eighties. From this pe-
riod and up to now, many film directors have used the Steadicam in order to 
reinvent the classical tracking shot2. Moreover, the new television series of  the 
1.  I presented a first version of  this article during the Conference “The Impact of  Technological In-
novations on the Historiography and Theory of  Cinema” (Montreal, November 1-6, 2011). In this 
occasion I had the opportunity to discuss the paper with many colleagues: I thank them all, and espe-
cially Francesco Casetti, Antonio Somaini, Adriano D’Aloia, Frank Kessler and Vinzenz Hediger.
2.  The first film which used the Steadicam was Bound for Glory (Al Ashby, U.S., 1976). Among 
the most important film which used this expressive instrument, The Shining (S. Kubrick, USA 
–GB 1980), Strange Days (Kathryn Bigelow, USA, 1995), La mort en direct (Deathwatch, Bertrand 
Tavernier, Fr– West Ger, UK, 1980), Snake Eyes (Brian De Palma, USA, 1998), The Russian Ark 
(Aleksàndr Sokurov, Russia – Germany, 2002)  Elephant (Gus Van Sant, USA, 2003).
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Nineties have made extensive use of  the Steadicam, which proved to be the 
ideal means to smoothly pass through confined spaces such as police stations 
rooms, hospital corridors, etc. The Steadicam implies a «subjective» camera's 
gaze: in other words, it expresses a perceptive and active grasp of  reality, and 
therefore it manifests a living, lived, ongoing process of  experience, made by 
an embodied and enworlded subject3.
A second innovation is the introduction of  portable digital cameras at the 
beginning of  the Nineties. On the one hand digital cameras reached an image 
quality close to that of  movie equipments; on the other hand the lightness of  
the devices allowed operators to recover hand-held camera practices, typical 
of  militant cinema, combat film or anthropological movies. These processes 
were intensively exploited in information shootings and video documentaries; 
at the same time, they became assets of  docudrama or mockumentary pro-
ductions, before finally reaching independent and mainstream feature films. 
In this way, the same forms of  expression (shaky camera, «dirty» quality of  the 
images, over and underexposure, etc.) can be found in very different products: 
documentaries and protest film, television series4, action and war movies5, rea-
lity TV shows, viral web videos, horror movies pretending to be the assembly 
of  found footage materials, which survived the operator’s death6, etc. 
A third series of  technological innovations is related to a new generation 
of  miniaturized digital cameras, which allowed the introduction of  helmet 
cameras (invented in 1987 by Mark Schulze, a San Diego director of  pho-
tography, for the shooting of  motorcycle racings), lipstick cameras, com-
bat cameras, video cameras integrated into cellular telephones. The videos 
produced by this type of  micro-cameras are today widespread, especially 
throughout the web: think for example of  videos produced during military 
combat with helmet cam; their homemade parodies or remakes; automobile 
or motorcycle accidents taken from the point of  view of  the victims; videos 
witnessing «live» historical events (earthquakes in Japan or Turkey, revolts in 
3.  In the Steadicam system, “the camera system is attached to the support arm [of  the operator] 
by means of  a free-floating gimbal. In this manner, the camera operator is able to pan or tilt 
the camera at will, and move it up or down, or side to side, in a free-floating manner […]. In 
short, the principal characteristic of  the Steadicam system is that it stabilizes the camera by 
using balance, isolation and inertia […] The most important characteristic of  the Steadicam 
is the quality of  movement it gives: movement which is not perceived through its defects, but 
rather through its perfection. On the contrary, the handheld camera is often used to emphasize 
instability, dynamism, struggles […]” (Ferrara, 2001: 19-20 and 73)
4.  Like for instance Homicide, created by Paul Attanasio, from 1993 to 1999; Riget by Lars von Trier 
from 1994 to 1995, The Shield, created by Shawn Ryan in 2002, and so on.
5.  See by way of  example Saving Private Ryan (Steven Spielberg, U.S.A., 1998), Black Hawk Down 
(Ridley Scott , USA, 2001), The Hurt Locker (Kathryn Bigelow, USA, 2008), etc.
6.  We can remind The Blair Witch Proiect (Daniel Myrick and Eduardo Sanchez, USA, 1999), Rec 
(Jaime Balaguer and Paco Plaza, Sp. 2007) and Rec II (2009), Diary of  the Dead (George A. Rome-
ro, 2007), Paranormal Activity (Oren Peli, USA, 2007) and Paranormal Activity II (Id, USA, 2010), 
Cloverfield (Matt Reeves, 2008), etc..
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the North Africa countries, the death of  Qaddafi, just to quote some recent 
cases), etc..
A specific area related to the development of  digital video was the video 
surveillance and control, which we consider the fourth technological innova-
tion behind the development of  the first person shot. Since the late Nineties, 
digital technology pushed up the market of  CCTV (Close Circuit Televisions), 
thanks to three factors: most sensitive sensors, the possibility of  controlling 
multiple cameras simultaneously, and a significant reduction of  prices7. This 
cameras (the so-called «pinhole video cameras», miniature still cameras, spy 
cameras, etc.) are easy to connect to digital communication networks, thus 
enabling the video surveillance of  public and private spaces even from a dis-
tance. As a result, video monitored areas spread rapidly; moreover, the expe-
rience of  watching video showing ordinary life spaces and actions became 
more and more diffused.
The fifth technological and linguistic innovation is the development of  
videogames playable in first person with sufficient speed, fluidity and realism8. 
Within the video game domain, the term “first person shot” refers to the pos-
sibility for the player to perform the actions planned by the game, keeping the 
visual and aural position of  a specific character, whose body isn’t usually enti-
rely visible and which is commonly called «avatar». Three videogames genres 
normally use this figure: the shooters, the vehicle (flight, drive tanks, racing) 
simulators, and some graphic adventure games. The roots of  these genres 
are established in the Seventies with games such as Maze War (1973) and Spa-
sim (1974); however, the first person shot videogames spread in the Nineties 
with the great success of  shooters such as Wolfenstein 3D (1992) and its direct 
successor Doom; the incredible success of  the latter opened the doors to pro-
ducts such as Duke Nukem 3D (1996), Quake (1996), Half  Life (1998). At the 
same time, the first-person point of  view was adopted for many point-and-
click graphic adventure games, in particular for the popular series opened by 
Myst (Cyan - Broderbund Software, 1993; it was followed during the following 
years by Riven and Myst III: Exile). Since the late Nineties up today, first per-
son videogames have been evolving in two directions: on the one hand they 
have become more realistic, on the other hand videogame narrative designers 
contaminated shooters, adventure game and drive simulators. As a result, we 
7.  “Digital cameras have many advantages for surveillance work, including small size, ‘instant’ 
pictures, and good sensitivity in low light conditions. No space is needed for film cassettes and 
the flash cards used to store images are tiny. They are easy to load; flipping in a memory card is 
easier than loading film. The pictures are almost instantly available, since there is no need to take 
film to a lab for processing. Thus, the pictures can be viewed and retaken if  they didn’t work the 
first time, and they can be viewed in private without going through a public film lab. They are 
also easy to upload to a computer network, since no scanning or conversion is usually necessary” 
(Petersen, 2001: 461)
8.  See, in particular, Rehac, 2008 and Helrander, 2009. About the relationships between videoga-
mes and new media see the seminal Wardrip-Fruin and Harrigan (eds.), 2004.
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find today a new generation of  war games such as the series of  Medal of  Honor 
(Dreamworks - Electronic Arts since 1999), Call of  Duty (Activision / Infinity 
Ward, from 2003), Crisis (from 2007); and a new kind of  driver and racing 
simulators such as the Grand Theft Auto series (Zachary Jones & Dave Clarke, 
from 1997).
As previously stated, my exposition has been forced to isolate the five di-
fferent sectors of  technological innovations; however, it is very important to 
highlight the fact that the first person shot emerges from the complex interac-
tion of  the different flows of  transformations. On the one hand, each tech-
nological innovation unfolded within a specific media platform: mainstream 
or independent cinema for steadicam; television programs for portable digital 
cameras; web sites and social networks for videos produced with miniaturized 
digital cameras; private devices for video surveillance; personal computers and 
game consoles for first person shooters. On the other hand, however, the di-
fferent media platform remediated each other in a complex way: in this sense 
the first person shot is a radically intermedial figure. I make just a few examples 
in this regard. First, the use of  the Steadicam in movies such as Strange Days 
or Elephant is (differently) inspired by first person shot videogames; similarly, 
many online videos shot with helmet cam are the parody of  contemporary 
videogames. Conversely, various videogames reproduce hand-held camera 
effects, e.g. when the “camera” follows the character along a war action or a 
football match. Thirdly, CCTV and video surveillance devices were re-used in 
many artistic video installations9, in television information and docu-fiction, in 
tv crime series10, and became a critical feature of  tv reality shows; moreover, 
surveillance cameras were used as a dramaturgic device in many film, like for 
instance Raising Cain (Brian de Palma, USA, 1992), Enemy of  the State (Tony 
Scott, USA 1992), Caché (Michael Haneke, France – Austria - Germany – Italy, 
2005), and so on. Finally, we can find movies which remediate, reincorporate 
and recombine almost all the different technological tools mentioned above: a 
clear example is Redacted (Brian De Palma, USA, 2007).
2.2. A comparison between first person shot and point of  view shot
After identifying the five major technological innovations responsible for 
the advent of  first person shot, I’ll try to determine the characteristic features 
of  this figure. For this purpose, it is worth comparing the first person shot 
with the classical point of  view shot or «subjective shot»11 In this regard, I will 
highlight three main differences.
9.  Levin, Frohne, Weibel, 2002; Somaini, 2010.
10.  Aaron Doyle, 2003.
11.  On the birth, evolution and semiotic features of  the filmic point of  view shot see Branigan, 
1984 and Casetti, 1991. More generally, on the cinematographic expression of  subjectivity, see 
Chateau (ed.), 2011.
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First, the point of  view shot is a typical figure of  the film and audiovisual 
media; on the contrary, the first person shot is an intermedia figure. The po-
int of  view shot is typically used in movies and television programs, and it is 
scarcely borrowed by other media. On the contrary, as we have just seen, the 
first person shot is a figure generated by the cross influence of  different media 
platforms. 
A second difference between the first person shot and the point of  view 
shot is that the latter requires a grammatical construction implying a first shot 
showing the character(s) who is (or are) watching, and a second one of  the 
object of  their vision; besides, this syntactical feature makes it difficult to keep 
the subjective point of  view for a long period12. In contrast, the first per-
son shot breaks these rules: the avatar’s face in first-person videogames never 
appears; in the combat videos taken by helmet cams, the soldier fighting can 
be seen only by accident; entire movies can be shot with a digital camera by 
hand (for example the horror movies quoted above), etc. To sum up, the first 
person shot entails a general extension of  the principle of  subjectivity implied 
(but partially manifested) by the point of  view shot. 
Finally, the point of  view shot system is based on the implicit but funda-
mental distinction between the subject(s) who is (or are) watching inside the 
diegetic world, and the object of  the camera which temporarily occupies their 
perceptual position. On the contrary, first person shot obliterates this distinc-
tion. There is certainly a polarity between first person shots attributable to the 
diegetic world’s subjects (and thus similar to the classic point of  view shot) 
and first person shot referable only to machines (for example the parts of  a 
film taken from surveillance videos). Nonetheless, the salient feature of  the 
first person shot is its hybrid nature of  a sight belonging to a subject / object. 
In many cases, the definition of  the ontological nature of  the first person shot 
viewer is delayed or remains ambiguous. In other cases there is a metonymic 
relationship between the camera and the body’s operator. Finally, in the case 
of  video games neither a camera nor a viewer is present, since both the world 
framed and the act of  framing are generated by the game software. In short, 
first person shot represents the sight of  located, embodied, enworlded, active, 
dynamic, and hybrid agents: I will call them bodies - sensors.
To sum up, the first person shot is an intermedia figure directly exhibiting 
the dynamic grasp of  the world enacted by a hybrid agent (a body – sensor), 
and consequently its perceptual, practical, emotional, living and ongoing ex-
perience.
12.  With a few notable exceptions: The Lady in the Lake (Robert Montgomery, USA 1947) and the 
first part of  The Dark Passage (Delmer Daves, USA, 1947). Both movies have been analyzed by 
Vivian Sobchack: see Sobchack, 2011 and 1992.
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3. For a new theory of  subject and subjectivity in film and media studies
3.1. The subject as position and location in Jean-Louis Baudry’s and Vivian Sobchack’s 
theories
In this section I will consider the theoretical implication of  the first per-
son shot. As previously stated, I consider the first person shot as a figure 
which expresses in sensorial terms a key theoretical concept: the idea of  sub-
ject and subjective identity. Since the question of  the status of  the subject is 
not new in the field of  film studies, I will analyze firstly the debate on this 
matter. In particular, I will focus on the “Apparatus theories” of  the Seven-
ties and on their more recent revision by film scholars inspired by phenome-
nological theories.
The topic of  the «subject» emerges within the debate about the ideolo-
gical implications of  the cinematic apparatus which takes place in France at 
the beginning of  the Seventies13. In his influential intervention «Ideological 
Effects of  the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus» (1970)14,  Jean-Louis Bau-
dry outlines a theory of  the subject on the basis of  the spectator’s relationship 
with the “cinematic apparatus”; the latter is intended as the combination of  
technological devices that allow the appearance of  the film image – it is the 
“appareil de base” of  film -; in any case, particular attention is devoted to the 
more restricted system involving theater, projector and screen –  it is the “dis-
positif  “ – which is the topic of  a subsequent article.
Baudry's intervention can be summarized in two key points. First, the cine-
matic apparatus defines the subject as «position» and a “location” on the basis 
of  filmic images. On the one hand, the single still frame defines the viewer’s 
spatial location on the basis of  the central and absolute point of  view derived 
from Renaissance perspective15.  On the other hand, different images define a 
«transcendental subject» who subsumes the fragmented and diversified flow 
of  images into a coherent unity of  consciousness.
Second, the apparatus produces an identification of  the viewer with the 
transcendental subject, by means of  a repetition of  the Lacanian “mirror sta-
ge” –where the screen takes on the function of  the Lacanian mirror16–: «[…] 
just as the mirror assembles the fragmented body in a sort of  imaginary inte-
13.  See Casetti, 1999: 184-203.
14.  Baudry, 1986.
15.  “The centre of  this space coincides with the eye which Jean Pellerin Viator will so appropriately 
call the ‘subject’ […] Based on the principle of  a fixed point of  reference, to which the visualized 
objects are defined, it specifies in return the position of  the ‘subject’, the very spot it must 
necessarily occupy” (Baudry, 1986: 289).
16.  «It is not specifically ‘imaginary’, nor as a reproduction of  its first configuration, that the self  
finds a ‘place’ in the cinema. This occurs, rather, as a sort of  proof  or verification of  that 
function, a solidification through repetition» (Baudry, 1986: 295)
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gration of  the self, the transcendental self  unites the discontinuous fragments 
of  phenomena, of  lived experience, into unifying meaning » 17.
Moreover, the use of  Lacan's mirror stage confirms and reinforces the 
idea of  the subject as a «location» defined by visual data. Regarding this point, 
cinema manifests its ideological nature, since it «constitutes the ‘subject’ by 
the illusory delimitation of  a central location […] It is an apparatus destined to 
obtain precise idelogical effects, necessary to the dominant ideology: creating 
a phantasmatization of  the subject, it collaborates with a marked efficacy in 
the maintenance of  idealism»18. 
The idea of  subject proposed by Baudry has been critically discussed, 
among others, by film scholars inspired by phenomenological theories. I shall 
focus in particular on arguments expressed by Sobchack, 1992. Sobchack’s 
basic idea is that not only the spectator but also the film itself  should be 
considered as a subject; indeed, the film expresses a perceptual, introceptive 
experience of  an “enworlded” body as well as the spectator. As a consequen-
ce, «the direct engagement, […] between spectator and film in the film expe-
rience cannot be considered a monologic one between a viewing subject and 
a viewed object. Rather, it is a dialogical and dialectical engagement of  two 
viewing subjects who also exist as visible objects (if  of  different material and 
in different ways to be elaborated further)» . More exactly, « […] if  we attempt 
to thematize and interpret the imbricated and dialectical correlations that 
exist between the correlational structure of  the film's intentional movement 
and visual activity and the correlational structure of  the spectator's intentio-
nal movement and visual activity, eight correlational possibilities emerge as 
primary»19; on the basis of  Sobchack’s conception, the eight possibilities differ 
depending on two kind of  factors: first, what is the object of  the perceptive 
intentionality manifested by the film and the spectator (it can be directed ei-
ther toward a noematic object, or towards the act of  intentioning, or to the 
subject who performs the act of  intentioning); second, whether the positions 
of  the two subjects are or are not aligned.
Sobchack’s arguments against Baudry’s position are based upon this set 
of  assumptions. According to Sobchack, Baudry (followed on this point by 
Christian Metz20) does not recognize that film constitutes a kind of  subject; 
consequently, he depicts the cinematic experience as an embodiment acted 
by the apparatus into the passive spectator, and therefore as a kind of  mani-
pulative constitution of  subjectivity - a theory dismissed as «paranoid» -. In 
other words, Sobchack applies to Baudry and Metz the same argument which 
she used against Lacan: the constitution of  the subject shouldn’t be taught as 
a «from the outside in» process, but rather as a «from the inside out» one21. 
17.  Ibid.
18.  Ibid.
19.  Sobchack, 1992: 278
20.  Metz, 1982. 
21.  Sobchack, 1992: 99.
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Other film scholars inspired by phenomenological theories agree with Sob-
chack about this latter argument, although they use different approaches22.
If  you compare Baudry’s theory of  subject with Sobchack’s arguments, 
you can easily notice that  Sobchack’s criticism focuses just on the second po-
int of  Baudry's argument: phenomenologist film scholars attack the idea that 
the subject is defined by the apparatus through the construction of  a defined 
visual location and its imposition to the spectator. In contrast, Sobchack’s 
discussion leaves intact the first point of  Baudry’s theory, that is the idea that 
the subject is defined by the position within a distinct location. Within the 
different “correlational possibilities” designed by the scholar, the spectators 
are once again defined on the basis of  a given location - which in this case 
corresponds to the position they assume in their relation with the scene they 
are viewing, with the act of  viewing itself, or with themselves as being
3.2. First person shot, or The subject as dis/position and dis/location
I can now express the main argument of  this second section of  my article. 
The first person shot as an intermedia figure, leads to a radical recasting of  
the ideas of  subject and subjectivity diffused in film studies. More exactly, we 
should contrast not only the view that the subject is defined “from the outside 
in” (Baudry’s second point), but also the conception of  the subject as defined 
by the position on a particular location (Baudry’s first point). As a consequen-
ce, I do propose a conception of  film subject as dis/located and dis/posed. 
Let me first consider Baudry’s second point. As previously stated, this po-
int has already been criticized by Sobchack, whose description is perfectly 
suited to the first person shot. Indeed, the body - sensor constitute itself  as a 
subject through the living experience of  a sensory, active, emotional, cognitive 
grasp of  the world, and trough a contemporary, ongoing, direct expression 
of  such an experience. As a consequence, film spectators are not confronted 
with a transcendental and disembodied gaze to identify with; on the contrary, 
they are confronted with an embodied, situated, «enworlded» (although non-
completely-human) subject, and they have to define a kind of  dialogical and 
dialectical engagement with it.
However, Sobchak’s arguments misses criticizing Baudry’s first point; the-
refore, she fails to consider the dynamical nature of  the subject, which is on 
the contrary well expressed by the first person shot. Indeed, the first person 
shot shows a constant move of  the body-sensor, often performing active and 
mobile explorations of  the world. Furthermore, the first person shot is often 
fragmented and thus it requires editing procedures; accordingly, spectators are 
required to monitor and link the continuous shifts of  the shots in order to 
22.  See in particular Casebier, 1991: 73-78, Shaw, 2008: 74-79. For a critique of  Baudry’s ideas from 
other positions see Aaron, 2007: 9-15.
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reorganize their experience in a coherent way. Hence, the idea of  the subject 
as a posited and located entity, gives way to an idea of  a dis/posited and dis/
placed subject. Subjects are neither “entities” nor “places”; indeed, they have 
an essentially temporal nature, since they are repeated and self  – producing 
events.
4. Conclusion: subject and subjectivity between media studies and neu-
ro-cognitive findings
In this article I focused on the first person shot, a stylistic figure wides-
pread within the contemporary media landscape, which results from a radical 
transformation of  the classical point of  view or subjective shot. In the first 
part of  my article I highlighted two key features of  the first person shot. On 
the one hand, it is an intermedia figure, as it arises from the reciprocal inte-
ractions of  different media platforms. On the other hand, it is an experiential 
figure, as it directly expresses the dynamic grasp of  the world, enacted by 
a hybrid agent (a body – sensor), and consequently its perceptual, practical, 
emotional, living and ongoing experience. 
In the second part of  my article, I analyzed the first person shot as a figure 
expressing in sensorial terms a well defined idea of  subject and subjectivity. 
This particular idea of  subject contrasts with the main conceptions adopted 
by film and media scholars, who consider the subject as an entity defined by 
the position in a specific location.  Rather, in the case of  the first person shot 
the subject is continuously redefined through a constant shifting; hence the 
subject should be conceived as dis-posed and dis-located. 
In conclusion, it is important to highlight the fact that such an idea of  sub-
ject and subjectivity is not limited to film and media studies; rather, it is widely 
assumed in current neuroscience and cognitive science of  mind influenced by 
phenomenology23. In this field of  studies the subject is defined on two levels. 
First, it is described as a core self  emerging from the elementary subjective 
experience24. Secondly, the subject is defined as a more complex narrative or 
23.  I outlined a theory of  media experience based on a match between semiotic tradition and current 
neuro-cognitive studies in Eugeni, 2010.
24.  «[…] The (minimal or core) self  possesses experiential reality, and is in fact identified with the 
first personal appearance of  the experiential phenomena. At its most primitive, self-experience 
is simply a question of  being pre-reflectively aware of  one’s own consciousness. […] This is 
what makes experience subjective. Although there are different types of  experiences (smelling 
hay, seeing a sunset, touching an ice cube, etc.), and although there are different types of  ex-
periential givenness (perceptual, imaginative, and recollective, etc.), there are common features 
as well. One such common feature is the quality of  mineness. With the possible exception of  
certain pathological states […], experiences that I live through in the first-person perspective 
are my experiences. […] Phenomenal consciousness consequently entails a primitive form of  
self-referentiality or for-meness». Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008: 204; see in general 197-215.
First person shot. New Forms of  Subjectivity between Cinema and Intermedia Networks Anàlisi Monogràfic 2012  29
autobiographical self. However, this narrative self  can not be thought of  as 
radically different from the nuclear one; rather, the latter should be seen a de-
velopment of  the first, obtained through a continuous and coherent process 
of  unfolding25. The critical issue here is that the element of  continuity bet-
ween the nuclear self  and the narrative self  is probably the subject’s agency, 
that is the ability of  the subjects to plan, act and monitor their movements and 
actions by means of  an ongoing and unfolding activity of  narrative account. 
Hence, the resulting idea of  subject is that of  a radically dynamical (id)entity, 
emerging from a continuous modulation of  states of  consciousness, and from 
a constantly repeated negotiation of  the relationships between their own “sa-
meness” and “selfhood”26. 
25.  «Conscious minds begin when self  comes to mind, when brains add a self  process to the mind 
mix, modestly at first but quite robustly later. The self  is built in distinct steps grounded on 
the protoself. The first step is the generation of  primordial feelings, the elementary feelings 
of  existence that spring spontaneously from the protoself. Next is the core self. The core self  
is about action—specifically, about a relationship between the organism and the object. The 
core self  unfolds in a sequence of  images that describe an object engaging the protoself  and 
modifying that protoself, including its primordial feelings. Finally, there is the autobiographical 
self. This self  is defined in terms of  biographical knowledge pertaining to the past as well as the 
anticipated future. The multiple images whose ensemble defines a biography generate pulses of  
core self  whose aggregate constitutes an autobiographical self.» Damasio, 2010: 16-18. See also 
Damasio, 1999: 7 and 127.
26.  «[…] on one side, identity as sameness (Latin idem, German Gleichheit, French memete), on the other, 
identity as selfhood (Latin ipse, German Selbstheit, French ipseite). […] It is with the question of  
permanence in time that the confrontation between our two versions of  identity becomes a genuine 
problem for the first time. [...] When we speak of  ourselves, we in fact have available to us two 
models of  permanence in time which can be summed up in two expressions that are at once 
descriptive and emblematic: character and keeping one’s word. In both of  these, we easily recognize a 
permanence which we say belongs to us. My hypothesis is that the polarity of  these two models 
of  permanence with respect to persons results from the fact that the permanence of  character 
expresses the almost complete mutual overlapping of  the problematic of  idem and of  ipse, while 
faithfulness to oneself  in keeping one’s word marks the extreme gap between the permanence 
of  the self  and that of  the same and so attests fully to the irreducibility of  the two problematics 
one to the other. [Moreover], the polarity I am going to examine suggests an intervention of  
narrative identity in the conceptual constitution of  personal identity in the manner of  a specific 
mediator between the pole of  character, where idem and ipse tend to coincide, and the pole of  self  
maintenance, where selfhood frees itself  from sameness.» Ricoeur, 1992: 116 and 118-119. On 
the same topic (although with different ontological implications) see Daniel Dennetts idea of  
the narrative self  as a «center of  narrative gravity»: see for instance Dennett 1991: 412 - 430; A 
comparison between Dennett’s and Ricoeur’s theories on the narrative self  is McCarthy, 2007.
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